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Abstract 
Online interactions form a growing share of the information exchange between investors, but 
existing research on online investor networks is still relatively scarce and focused on forex trading 
platforms. This thesis is the first study to observe and analyze user behavior in an online investor 
network focused on the stock market, specifically the Shareville community consisting of customers 
of the Nordic bank Nordnet. Its purpose is to investigate how activity and portfolio performance 
determine an individual investor’s centrality in the Shareville network, whether investors influence 
each other’s trading decisions, and whether the selective communication hypothesis, i.e. the 
tendency to discuss profitable trades more frequently than losses, holds in an environment where 
portfolio contents and returns are public information.  
This thesis consists of three studies regarding 1) factors determining the centrality of a user in the 
Shareville network, 2) the influence of central users on trades by their followers, and 3) selective 
communication in the network. In Study 1, regression analysis is used to determine how past 
performance and communication in the Shareville network are correlated with the number of 
followers a user has, and how users whose own followers are well-connected within the network 
differ from the baseline. In Study 2, buy-side trades made by users with followers are analyzed to 
determine how frequently the followers copy the trade by the end of the next trading day. In Study 
3, returns from sell-side trades made by Shareville users are reconstructed by analyzing two years 
of trading data, and trade outcomes are combined with comments users make on their own trades. 
The commenting frequency on gains and losses is analyzed separately for Finnish and Swedish 
Shareville members. 
Results indicate that 1) historical portfolio performance and activity in the network are relevant 
but inadequate variables in explaining the number of followers a user has. Commenting on trades 
appears to be the most relevant form of activity in this regard, while e.g. comments in discussion 
groups or on individual instruments have less or no value. Results also provide 2) strong evidence 
of users copying trades of those users they are following. Finally, 3) the knowledge that portfolios 
and trades can be openly viewed by other users does not prevent users from practicing selective 
communication, so that trades resulting in gains are discussed more frequently than those resulting 
in losses. Statistically significant results on selective communication are obtained only for Swedish 
users, although for Finnish users the lack of statistical significance may result from a small sample 
size rather than complete absence of the effect.  
The results and discussion presented in this thesis will hopefully aid in further development of 
Nordnet’s Shareville platform, inform future studies on the characteristics and behavior of retail 
stock market investors in online investor networks, and provide retail investors with a better 
understanding of their own behavior and that of others in the network – for example, how 
phenomena such as selective communication give a biased view of investor skill. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Inhimillisen kanssakäymisen saadessa yhä uusia muotoja tietoverkoissa tarvitaan tutkimustietoa 
sijoittajien vuorovaikutuksesta heille suunnatuissa palveluissa. Aihepiiriä on tutkittu jonkin verran 
valuuttasijoittajien verkostojen osalta, mutta tässä tutkielmassa perehdytään ensimmäistä kertaa 
osakesijoittajien käyttäytymiseen heille suunnatulla verkostoitumisalustalla. Tutkimuksen aineisto 
on peräisin Nordnet-pankin Shareville-palvelusta, ja sen tarkoitus on selvittää, miten aktiivisuus ja 
historiallinen tuotto vaikuttavat käyttäjän keskeisyyteen Sharevillen sosiaalisessa verkostossa, 
miten sijoittajat vaikuttavat toistensa kaupankäyntiin, sekä kommentoivatko sijoittajat 
todennäköisemmin voitollisia kuin tappiollisia kauppojaan (valikoivan viestinnän hypoteesi), 
vaikka salkku ja osakekaupat ovat palvelussa automaattisesti muiden nähtävillä. 
Opinnäytetyö koostuu kolmesta osatutkimuksesta, joiden aiheet ovat 1) käyttäjän keskeisyyteen 
vaikuttavat tekijät Sharevillen sosiaalisessa verkostossa, 2) keskeisten käyttäjien vaikutus heidän 
seuraajiensa kauppoihin, sekä 3) valikoiva viestintä Sharevillessä. Tutkimuksessa 1 selvitetään 
regressioanalyysillä käyttäjän historiallisen tuoton ja viestinnän korrelaatiota hänen seuraajiensa 
lukumäärän kanssa. Lisäksi arvioidaan, miten ne käyttäjät, joiden seuraajat ovat tavallista 
paremmin verkostoituneita, eroavat muista käyttäjistä. Tutkimuksessa 2 selvitetään, miten 
todennäköisesti käyttäjän seuraajat matkivat tämän osakeostoja alkuperäisestä ostohetkestä 
seuraavan kaupankäyntipäivän iltaan mennessä. Tutkimuksessa 3 rekonstruoidaan käyttäjien 
osakemyyntien tuotot kahden vuoden ajalta ja verrataan näitä käyttäjien todennäköisyyteen 
kommentoida yksittäisiä osakemyyntejä. Suomalaisten ja ruotsalaisten Shareville-käyttäjien 
taipumusta kommentoida voittoja ja tappioita tarkastellaan erikseen. 
Tulokset osoittavat, että 1) historiallinen tuotto ja aktiivinen viestintä, erityisesti osakekauppojen 
kommentointi, ovat merkittäviä selittäjiä käyttäjän seuraajien määrälle, mutta ne eivät yksinään 
selitä aineistossa esiintyvää vaihtelua. Toisaalta jotkut viestintäkanavat kuten Sharevillen 
keskusteluryhmät vaikuttaisivat olevan vähemmän merkityksellisiä verkostoitumiselle. Lisäksi 
osoittautui, että 2) käyttäjät toisinaan kopioivat seuraamiensa käyttäjien kauppoja, ja 3) tieto 
osakesalkun ja kauppojen julkisuudesta ei poista valikoivaa viestintää, eli käyttäjät kommentoivat 
voitollisia kauppoja todennäköisemmin kuin tappiollisia. Tilastollisesti merkitseviä todisteita 
valikoivasta viestinnästä saatiin vain ruotsalaisten käyttäjien ryhmästä, mutta koska ruotsalaisia oli 
aineistossa ylipäätään enemmän kuin suomalaisia, on mahdollista että ilmiö hukkui suomalaisten 
ryhmässä tilastolliseen kohinaan. 
Tässä työssä esitetyt tulokset ja pohdinta toivottavasti tukevat Sharevillen kehitystyötä, toimivat 
pohjana tuleville tutkimuksille piensijoittajien käyttäytymisestä ja vuorovaikutuksesta 
tietoverkkojen välityksellä, sekä auttavat piensijoittajia ymmärtämään paremmin omaan ja muiden 
sijoittajien käyttäytymiseen liittyviä ilmiöitä sosiaalisen median palveluissa, kuten valikoivan 
viestinnän antamaa harhaanjohtavaa kuvaa sijoittajan taidoista. 
Avainsanat  sijoittajaverkosto, käyttäytymistieteellinen rahoitus, piensijoittaja, sosiaalinen 
kaupankäynti 
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1 Introduction 
How does the individual stock market investor interact and share knowledge with their peers? 
Countless books on investing and trading strategies have been written by successful investors, traders, 
and fund managers. Friends and co-workers are often eager to recount tales of successful trades over 
a mug of beer. Yet such communication can be biased in numerous ways. For example, Kaustia and 
Knüpfer (2012) find evidence that positive stock market returns are followed by an increase in future 
stock market entry rates in the local neighborhood, but the opposite effect is not present for negative 
returns. This suggests that investors tend to share only successful trades with their peers (the selective 
communication hypothesis), which can lead to e.g. selection and attribution biases when evaluating 
the trading behavior and strategies of peer investors. The purpose of this thesis is to determine how 
activity and portfolio performance determine an individual investor’s influence on peers in an online 
environment, and whether the selective communication hypothesis holds in an environment where 
portfolio contents and returns are public information. This thesis represents the first effort to explore 
these questions within the context of an online investor network of retail stock market investors. 
1.1 Online investor networks – untapped source for behavioral finance research 
Developments in communication technology provide unprecedented opportunities for retail investors 
and traders to interact and learn from each other. Electronic trading platforms have been available to 
private individuals since the 1990s, but the more recent proliferation of social media has led to the 
creation of investor networking platforms which enable investors and traders to anonymously engage 
in discussions, view each other’s portfolios and trades, and even automatically replicate the trades of 
their peers. Most of these platforms, such as eToro, Tradeo, and ZuluTrade, are focused on trading in 
currency markets and stock derivatives such as contracts for difference. Others, such as the Shareville 
platform1 launched by the Nordic bank Nordnet in 2014, are targeted to retail stock market investors, 
most of whom are unable or unwilling to practice day trading and are also unfamiliar with the 
derivative markets. An important feature of these platforms is the opportunity to minimize selective 
communication: since portfolio contents, trades, and returns are constantly visible to all users, 
investors should in principle have a better opportunity to learn from their peers’ mistakes. However, 
it is reasonable to assume that investor behavior in online investor networks will still be governed by 
the same laws and biases that apply in more traditional settings. Well-known examples include the 
attribution bias, base rate fallacy, and confirmation bias introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
                                                 
1 https://www.shareville.fi 
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Since the appearance of online investor networks is a recent phenomenon, little research has been 
conducted on peer influence on investor behavior in these networks. Heimer and Simon (2014) 
investigate how selective communication drives increased currency trading within an unnamed online 
investor network. Heimer (2014) suggests that rational investors who seek to form connections with 
skilled investors in order to acquire information may give rise to seemingly irrational loss aversion 
and tendency to close winning positions too early. Based on EUR/USD currency trading data from 
the eToro platform, Pan et al. (2012) show that the strategy of automatically mirroring (replicating) 
the trades of the most successful traders based on historical performance significantly outperforms 
the average independently placed trade and produces positive returns. Exploring an extended version 
of the same dataset, Liu et al. (2014) provide results in line with the prospect theory originally 
formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which predicts that individuals are disposed to 
realizing even small gains but are reluctant to realize mounting losses. This kind of behavior leads to 
poor performance on the market because it prevents large gains from winning positions while leading 
to large losses from losing positions. Liu et al. (2014) also provide prospect theory-based suggestions 
for behavioral metrics that would allow traders to better recognize which peers to follow based on 
expected future performance. 
Scarcity aside, the main limitation of the existing research on investor networks is its focus on 
currency trading which is, to a large extent, based on exchange rate speculation and statistical 
arbitrage, seeking profits mainly from the aggregate behavior of other market participants. The stock 
market, on the other hand, provides in principle a vehicle for investing in a company’s business, and 
the long-term value of the investment is driven by the profitability of that company’s business. 
Nevertheless, as discussed by Thaler (1999) and Shiller (2003), research into behavioral finance has 
unequivocally shown that the stock market is rife with inefficiencies resulting from various 
mechanisms. When these are combined with the individual investor’s own knowledge, experiences, 
and cognitive biases, the stock market forms a complex environment with ample opportunities for the 
individual investor to improve their long-term returns through peer learning on investor networks. 
The best, most granular readily available data on the influence of social networking on trading and 
learning behavior of stock traders and investors is constantly being created and collected on platforms 
such as Shareville.  
1.2 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis consists of three independent studies on investor behavior in the Shareville network. The 
research is based on six months of panel data collected from the Shareville platform and documenting 
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the social network links and discussions of individual investors, as well as concurrent stock trading 
data from the Nordnet accounts linked with the Shareville profile. All trades in equity shares are 
included in the analyses, but not derivatives, funds, bonds, or commodities. Data for the thesis was 
provided in an anonymized format by Nordnet, and the results will also aid Shareville development. 
Each of the three studies explores one key research question to characterize peer influence and 
communication in Shareville. The research questions are chosen to not only provide descriptive 
information about Shareville users, but also to explore topics that the existing literature does not 
adequately cover. First, previous studies on online investing networks have not examined in detail 
what factors influence connection formation within the network. The limited research that exists on 
network formation and user behavior concerns primarily currency trading networks. To address this 
topic in the context of Shareville’s stock investor network, Study 1 investigates What attributes and 
behavior determine an investor’s centrality in the network?  
Second, while copying other users’ actions is a popular trading strategy within online currency trading 
networks, so that copy trading can even be automated on many popular platforms, it is not known 
whether stock investors exhibit similar behavior on networking platforms focused on the stock market. 
Therefore, Study 2 seeks to quantify To what extent do central users influence trades by their 
followers?  
Third, as noted earlier, numerous biases influence both the originating and receiving party in investor 
communication. While online investor networks have the potential to mitigate some of these biases, 
their effectiveness in this regard is by no means guaranteed. Existing behavioral finance literature 
provides circumstantial evidence of selective communication (i.e. an investor’s increased propensity 
to communicate after gains in the market), but the topic has not been studied at the level of individual 
trades and communication related to them. To both examine the utility of investor networks in 
mitigating biased communication and on the other hand search for direct evidence to support or refute 
the selective communication hypothesis, Study 3 focuses on the question Are investors more inclined 
to discuss profitable trades than losses?  
Another obvious question related to the utility of investor networks is whether they support investor 
learning and allow investors to make better, i.e. more profitable or less risky, investment decisions. 
However, the Shareville data available in this thesis covers a period of only 6 months, while equity 
investors often have a longer time horizon. For example, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) show that 
empirical evidence for the prospect theory is compatible with a model where investors evaluate their 
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asset allocation with a roughly one-year horizon. Therefore, the question of investors’ ability to learn 
from their peers and make better investment decisions is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The next chapter summarizes the existing research on peer influence and trading behavior in investor 
networks and introduces the three research hypotheses examined in this thesis. Chapter 3 describes 
the data used, Chapters 4-6 summarize the motivations, methods, and key results of the three studies, 
while the results from each study are interpreted and discussed in Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 summarizes 
the conclusions and provides suggestions for further research topics.  
Unless otherwise indicated, throughout this work “investor network” and similar terms refer to 
explicit connections between individual investors and traders on a social networking platform such 
as Shareville. Any real-life social networks of these individuals are outside the scope of this study. 
Also, the broad topic of this study, social investing, should not be confused with socially responsible 
investing. Finally, the term “investor” is used as a general term covering individuals with various 
short-term and long-term investment strategies, but in some parts of the text, “investor” and “trader” 
may be used for convenience to differentiate buy-and-hold approaches from short-term speculation 
and arbitrage. Naturally, individual users’ strategies are more varied, but a detailed categorization of 
investment strategies is not necessary for this work. 
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2 Background 
This chapter provides an overview of relevant research on investor peer influence and behavior, first 
in traditional settings and then in online investor networks, and presents the research questions and 
hypotheses examined in this thesis. 
2.1 Literature on investor behavior and peer interactions 
Although research on investor peer interaction is too extensive to present in its entirety, evidence 
overwhelmingly indicates that peer interactions influence market entry decisions, adoption of 
investment strategies, and also investing goals. For example, Hong et al. (2004) provide evidence that 
households are more likely to invest in the stock market when their peers participate in the market, 
and Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) show that positive historical stock returns in the local neighborhood 
increase stock market entry rate, particularly in areas with good opportunities for social learning. Pool 
et al. (in press) find that real-life social interactions lead to more overlapping portfolios among 
professional fund managers, and information sharing can improve risk-adjusted returns. A more 
extensive literature review on social interaction in the stock market is presented by König (2013). 
Since evidence unequivocally demonstrates the influence of social interaction on everyday 
investment decisions, an obvious argument for the utility of online social networks is their potential 
for distribution of knowledge and learning between investors. As discussed by Thaler (1999) and 
Shiller (2003), since rational decision making and information symmetry between market participants 
are important theoretical prerequisites of an efficient market, real-life market inefficiencies and 
investor behavioral biases enable skilled investors to earn abnormal risk-adjusted returns. On the 
other hand, especially inexperienced investors fall victim of fallacies identified in the academic 
literature decades ago. Since the focus of this thesis is investor peer interaction, the reader interested 
in individual investor behavior is guided to the recent, excellent summary of the relevant literature 
by Barber and Odean (2013). 
Although outside the topic of online investor networks, the work by Ozsoylev et al. (2014) provides 
an interesting view into trading behavior and information diffusion between central and peripheral 
investors in a stock market. Using a complete 12-month dataset of all trades in the Istanbul stock 
exchange, they reconstruct an empirical investor network where two investors are connected if they 
execute similar trades (same instrument and direction) within 30 minutes of each other at least three 
times during the 12-month period analyzed. The authors find that central actors in the empirical 
investor network earn higher returns and utilize information more quickly than other individuals. 
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They also suggest that information propagates in the investor population through a decentralized 
diffusion mechanism rather than e.g. through mainstream media channels. 
The network reconstruction approach chosen by Ozsoylev et al. (2014) has some shortcomings. For 
example, the median number of trades for individual investors in their data is eight, so that to establish 
a connection between two hypothetical “median investors”, three out of these eight trades would need 
to be very closely timed copies of each other (except for the amount traded). This seems intuitively 
unlikely for two retail investors even under regular information exchange. A second, related issue is 
the high number of first-degree connections implied: for the “median investor”, eight trades during 
the 12-month period would establish connections to 158 other traders. Obviously, no real trader 
communicates with such a high number of individuals on a few trades, so the method used is likely 
to generate a large number of connections that do not exist in the real world.  
There may be alternative explanations to the large number of connections identified in the Ozsoylev 
et al. (2014) study, such as certain individuals preferring to trade in certain stocks and times of day, 
which would give rise to more coincidental connections than a completely random process. The 
authors cover some potential shortcomings of their approach in their paper, and their conclusions on 
information diffusion and identifying central investors in the network are certainly plausible. 
However, it appears intuitively unlikely that their approach to reconstructing the investor network 
reflects actual connections between retail investors. 
A common and potentially valid counterargument to the quality and reliability of information 
disseminated through an investor network is that skilled investors would prefer to keep private any 
information or experience that might give them an advantage in the market. However, using empirical 
data from real-life investor network settings, Krasny (2013) and Dijk et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
alongside monetary gains, also factors such as the pursuit of social status influence investor portfolio 
composition. In both of these studies social rank is represented by relative wealth, but it is plausible 
that also other measures of social status, such as the number of followers within the investor network, 
and even altruistic reasons would motivate at least some successful investors to share their experience 
and learnings with others.  
2.2 Research on online investor networks 
An obvious benefit from studying investor interactions in online investor networks is that nearly all 
communication on the platform is documented, and connections between individuals are made 
explicit. Due to the relative novelty of social media, research on investor behavior and trading activity 
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on investor networking platforms is limited, but there are two bodies of work that are especially 
relevant for this thesis. The first one comprises research on a dataset from an unnamed social 
networking website that allows users to anonymously share their currency trading history and interact 
with each other by messaging and forming bilateral friendships. The research has been presented in 
Heimer and Simon (2014) and Heimer (2014).  
Heimer and Simon (2014) investigate how selective communication drives increased trading within 
the social network as proposed in a theoretical model by Han and Hirshleifer (2015). The authors 
show that traders who earn positive returns are more likely to send peer-to-peer messages, and 
extreme returns tend to be advertised by active traders due to higher portfolio volatility. This leads to 
the message recipients erroneously attributing the sender’s success to their strategy (attribution bias). 
The increased social interaction propagates active trading strategies in the network and leads to 
increased portfolio volatilities in the long term, but the increased volatility is typically not 
compensated with higher returns. 
The second paper by Heimer (2014) focuses on the role of social interaction in explaining the 
disposition effect. Key elements of the disposition effect are loss aversion (unwillingness to realize 
losses) and reflection effect (risk seeking for losing positions, risk aversion for winning positions) as 
depicted in the prospect theory formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Kaustia (2010) 
provides an extensive literature review on the subject. Heimer (2014) argues that the disposition effect 
arises naturally from the behavior of rational investors who seek to form connections with skilled 
investors in order to acquire information. By closing winning positions and holding on to losing 
positions, the investor can demonstrate higher realized returns and thus increase their bargaining 
power in the market for information.  
While Heimer (2014) refutes various alternative explanations to his observations, he does not 
consider the possibility that the heightened disposition effect could arise from reluctance to publicly 
admit mistakes in the social network. In other words, consciousness of the social network could 
plausibly intensify the regret aversion effect described by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Both 
interpretations would be compatible with the evidence by Krasny (2013) and Dijk et al. (2014) that 
pursuit of social status influences investor portfolio composition. All in all, the large body of literature 
suggests that different authors are capturing coexisting and complementary aspects of the disposition 
effect. 
Whereas the work by Heimer and Simon (2014) and Heimer (2014) primarily focuses on the 
communication between individual traders, another body of work analyzes the aggregate behavior of 
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EUR/USD currency traders using data from the eToro trading and networking platform. Pan et al. 
(2012) analyze the performance of eToro users who can place trades independently (single trade), 
replicate one trade by another user (copy trade), or automatically copy all trades made by another 
user (mirror trade, where the traded amount is proportional to the portfolio size). One of the authors’ 
key findings is that the mean return on investment (ROI) from single and copy trades is negative, 
with single trades performing more poorly, while mirror trades generate on average small but 
significantly positive returns.  
Pan et al. (2012) also evaluate “wisdom of the crowd” by comparing the mean daily ROI of the top 
5, 10, 50, and 100 users selected by 1) historical returns and 2) number of followers (mirrorers) in the 
social network. For the top 5 and 10 users, approaches 1) and 2) produce similar ROI, but as the 
number of users increases, approach 1) produces a higher ROI than 2). This implies that wisdom of 
the crowd is inferior to a simple rule-based method in identifying the best experts to follow (beyond 
the top 10). A third observation by the same authors is that except for the 50 or so most popular users, 
the number of followers appears to be largely independent of the user’s accumulated returns. In 
summary, while a number of individual forex traders may be able to consistently earn positive returns 
on the eToro platform, historical returns appear to be only one criterion by which users pick other 
users to follow in the online network, and users as a group are consequently suboptimal in choosing 
which users to imitate. 
Liu et al. (2014) also analyze the trading behavior of eToro users using at least partially the same 
dataset. Their data illustrates how a vast majority of the trading positions are open for a relatively 
short time, and very rarely longer than a day. They also demonstrate that mirror trades are on average 
the most profitable type of trade and generate positive ROI, similar to the previous study. The main 
contribution of their study is the introduction of three behavioral metrics that could be used to identify 
users with high future probability of placing successful trades. The metrics are based on the risk-
reward ratio of trades, holding time of winning and losing positions, and win-loss ROI ratio. In 
essence, these metrics quantify loss aversion and reflection effect as depicted in the prospect theory 
formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). While the authors suggest that these metrics can assist 
in choosing which experienced investors to follow in the network, individual users could also use 
such metrics to identify their own tendencies for inefficient trading behavior in order to avoid such 
behavior in the future. 
  9  
 
2.3 Research questions and hypotheses 
There are numerous areas in online investor networking and behavioral finance that the nascent 
literature does not yet cover, and the purpose of this thesis is to fill some of those gaps. First of all, 
results from currency trading studies cannot be applied directly to investor behavior in stock markets. 
The most obvious difference between the two is that currency trading seeks to benefit from short-
term (typically intraday) fluctuations in market prices, while stock positions are often taken with a 
medium or long-term perspective (months, years, or in some cases even decades) to passively benefit 
from value creation by the underlying company and possibly perceived mispricing of the company’s 
stock.  
Stock market investors may also compare companies on multiple quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions such as size, balance sheet, profitability, market valuation, sector, strategy, etc. 
Dissemination of knowledge, opinions, and analyses about individual companies, market sentiment, 
and behavioral finance topics through an investor network may allow individual investors to improve 
their social status and gain followers in the network. Online commentaries become even more 
valuable if they can be evaluated in light of the commenter’s own historical performance and activity 
in the market, but the existing research on online investor networks does not cover these aspects.  
To shed light on the accrual and practical implications of influence in the network,  this thesis explores 
two research questions: What attributes and behavior determine an investor’s centrality in the 
network?, examined in Study 1, and To what extent do central users influence trades by their 
followers?, examined in Study 2. Another interesting topic explored by Heimer (2014) and Kaustia 
and Knüpfer (2012) is the influence of profits and losses on the willingness of investors to 
communicate with others. The authors provide evidence that investors are more inclined to discuss 
their profits than their losses with their peers. The data available in this thesis uniquely enables 
analyzing the subject at the individual investor and trade level. Therefore, the research question 
explored in Study 3 is Are investors more inclined to discuss profitable trades than losses? 
Based on these research questions, three hypotheses are formed: 
Hypothesis 1 (Study 1): The centrality of an investor in the network is determined by their past returns 
and activity on the network, such as commenting on individual stocks and communicating with other 
investors. 
Hypothesis 2 (Study 2): If an influential user trades in a particular stock, their followers are more 
likely to trade in that stock more actively than other Shareville users. 
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Hypothesis 3 (Study 3): An individual user is more likely to comment on trades in which they realize 
gains than on trades in which they realize losses. 
The next chapter describes the data available for the three studies, after which the methods and results 
for each study are presented separately in the following chapters.  
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3 Data 
The dataset used to explore the research questions and hypotheses presented in the previous chapter 
contains Shareville user data from 26 September 2014 (date when Shareville was launched for the 
wider public) to 31 March 2015. Data extraction and analysis were performed using Oracle SQL and 
the R language and software environment2. The data was anonymized so that personal data such as 
users’ names had been removed or masked. 
Shareville is only available to Nordnet customers, and enabling all features requires the user to share 
at least one portfolio associated with their Nordnet account. However, the Shareville service itself is 
free of charge. Most Shareville users are Swedish, Finnish, Norwegian or Danish, with Swedish and 
Finnish users forming the two largest groups. Most users choose to use an anonymous username.  
Shareville users can follow other users and specific instruments (i.e. configure the service to provide 
automatic notifications about the activities of a certain user, and about trades and comments made on 
a particular instrument), publish comments on completed trades, individual instruments, other users’ 
walls, and in topical discussion groups, and send private messages to other users. Each Shareville 
user can also view the instruments owned by another user, and for each instrument its share of total 
portfolio value, but the portfolio value itself is not disclosed. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the user’s view 
of another user’s wall and a specific instrument, respectively. All users can see other users’ portfolio 
returns for up to three years and a 1-year Sharpe ratio relative to risk-free return. In addition, each 
user is assigned a star rating based on their returns and Sharpe ratio: users with positive 1-year 
portfolio returns receive one star, users with a Sharpe ratio in the top 50% of all shared portfolios 
with positive returns receive two stars, and users in the top 10% receive three stars.  
The dataset in this study contains for each Shareville user the users and instruments they are following, 
discussion group memberships, comments they have made, and metadata of private messaging 
between individuals (i.e. messaging participants and timestamps of messages but not message 
content). It contains also the portfolio returns and Sharpe ratios and star rankings as of 31 March 2015. 
To be included in the analyses, a user account had to be active on 31 March 2015 (i.e. user had not 
deleted their account) and share at least one Nordnet portfolio. A small number of portfolios were 
flagged as abnormal in the original data, e.g. because they appear to have invalid historical returns, 
and were therefore excluded. Also, by default, Shareville users are configured to follow four Nordnet 
                                                 
2 http://www.r-project.org/ 
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bloggers in the network. These four individuals were excluded from all analyses and calculations. 
The total number of Shareville accounts included in the analyses is 39,920 (as of 31 March 2015; see 
Figure 3). 
The dataset also contains monthly account and daily trading data from the Shareville users’ Nordnet 
accounts spanning the period from January 2012 to March 2015. Each account can contain cash 
deposits and financial instruments such as stocks, options, warranties, bonds, mutual funds, etc. In 
this thesis, only trading activity and returns related to stocks are considered. Nordnet customers trade 
primarily in their home countries’ stock exchanges, but they also have access to other Nordic (Finnish, 
Swedish, Norwegian, Danish), German and North American markets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot illustrating the user’s view of Shareville. The screenshot displays the profile of a 
followed user, including their star rating based on volatility adjusted returns, number of followers, 
past returns, and recent trades and comments. 
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Figure 2: Shareville screenshot showing market data and discussions related to a specific share. 
  
 
Figure 3: Growth of Shareville user base since the service was publicly launched on 26 Sep 2014. 
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4 Study 1: Attributes valued by Shareville users 
Hypothesis 1: The centrality of an investor in the network is determined by their past returns and 
activity on the network, such as commenting on individual stocks and communicating with other 
investors. 
4.1 Motivation 
Hypothesis 1 addresses an essential question of human networking: why does a connection arise 
between two individuals? Previous studies on online investing networks have not examined this 
subject in detail. An intuitive answer in the context of Shareville is that users with high historical 
returns and users who are active communicators in the network will attract the most followers. 
However, without any quantitative foundation such statements are easily challenged, and their 
implications remain unclear. Does better performance automatically mean more followers? What is 
the relative importance of portfolio performance and activity in the network? What kind of 
communication activity is relevant? To what extent do these variables explain network formation? 
Even when considering the matter from a purely business point of view, it is difficult to justify and 
allocate investments in service development based on vague intuition. This study analyzes well-
connected individuals in the Shareville network to provide a data-based representation of 
characteristics relevant to connection formation.  
4.2 Methods 
A review of basic network analysis concepts and methods is provided by Newman (2003). The 
Shareville network can be represented as a directed network, where each user corresponds to a node 
in the network, and following another user corresponds to a directed connection (edge) from the 
follower to the followed user. Centrality is a measure of the relative importance of an individual node 
in the network, and to examine Hypothesis 1, a quantitative definition of centrality in the Shareville 
investor network must be chosen.  
The most basic network centrality measure is the in-degree centrality 𝐶𝐷, i.e. the number of incoming 
first-degree connections (followers) a Shareville user has in the network. However, in-degree 
centrality treats all connections as equally important. In the case of Shareville, it can be argued that 
having followers who themselves have many followers is a better indication of influence in the 
network. Eigenvector-based centrality measures take also into account the centrality of neighboring 
nodes. For example, the Pagerank centrality 𝐶𝑃 by Page et al. (1999) is defined such that the centrality 
of an individual node represents the probability that a random walk through the network will terminate 
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at that node. Thus, nodes with inbound connections from other nodes with many inbound connections 
will have a higher Pagerank centrality.  
To examine Hypothesis 1, 𝐶𝐷 and 𝐶𝑃 are calculated for each Shareville user with at least one follower 
as of 31 March 2015. R functions used for the network analysis can be found in the igraph package, 
and the functions degree and page.rank are used to calculate the centrality measures, with the 
Pagerank damping factor (representing the probability of continuing the random walk after each step) 
set to 0.85 (default value used in many applications of the method). Figure 4 shows that the two 
centrality measures are strongly correlated, but may also differ considerably for some users. Analysis 
and comparison of 𝐶𝐷 and 𝐶𝑃 is expected to expose features and behavior considered valuable by 
Shareville users. 
 
Figure 4: Natural logarithms of in-degree centrality and Pagerank centrality in the Shareville network 
as of 31 March 2015. Each data point corresponds to one user with at least one follower, and the 
centrality values are incremented by one to avoid taking logarithm of zero. Total number of data 
points is 8,412, and the largest number of followers for one user is 2,466. 
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First, treating the natural logarithm of 𝐶𝐷 as the dependent variable, a multiple linear regression is 
performed on the user’s historical returns and various descriptive variables in the Shareville social 
network. Table 1 summarizes the symbols and regression variables used for examining Hypothesis 1. 
All variables in the regression are calculated as of 31 March 2015, and the regression coefficients are 
analyzed to determine whether they differ significantly from zero (details provided below; the 
threshold of statistical significance is set at p = 0.05):  
ln 𝐶𝐷,𝑗 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ⋅ 𝑌𝑗 + 𝛼2 ⋅ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝛼3 ⋅ 𝑆1,𝑗 + 𝛼4 ⋅ 𝑆2,𝑗 + 𝛼5 ⋅ 𝑆3,𝑗 
            + 𝛼6 ⋅  ln(𝐴𝐺,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛼7 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝑇,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛼8 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝐼,𝑗 + 1)  
            + 𝛼9 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝑈,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛼10 ⋅ ln(𝑀1,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛼11 ⋅ ln(𝑀2,𝑗 + 1)  (1) 
where subscript 𝑗 denotes the individual user, 𝑌𝑗 denotes the 1-year return for user 𝑗, 𝐻𝑗  the 1-year 
Sharpe ratio, and 𝑆𝑘,𝑗  are mutually exclusive dummy variables corresponding to the Sharpe ratio 
based star rating of users within Shareville (𝑘 = 1 indicates one star, 𝑘 = 2 indicates two stars, and 
𝑘 = 3 indicates three stars). While the 1-year return and Sharpe ratio are also visible to other users, 
the star classification is more prominently displayed in the user interface, and provides a simple 
means for evaluating a user’s past performance relative to their peers. Thus, it is interesting to see 
whether the absolute numeric values of 𝑌𝑗  and 𝐻𝑗  provide any additional predictive power to the 
regression beyond the simple star rating.  
The variables 𝐴𝑘,𝑗 denote various activity measures in the network: the number of comments made 
by the user in Shareville discussion groups (𝑘 = 𝐺), comments on trades (𝑘 = 𝑇), comments on 
individual instruments (𝑘 = 𝐼), and comments on other users’ walls (𝑘 = 𝑈). The remaining two 
variables are 𝑀1,𝑗, the number of individual Shareville users, excluding followers of user 𝑗, whom 
user 𝑗 has contacted with a private message, and 𝑀2,𝑗 , the number of individual Shareville users, 
excluding followers of user 𝑗, who have contacted user 𝑗 with a private message. Users who are not 
followers of user 𝑗 at the time of the messaging are counted towards 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 even if they later become 
followers. These two variables are included to examine whether actively seeking contact with other 
users will lead to gaining followers, and whether other users tend to seek out the opinions of 
influential users. 
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Table 1: Summary of regression variables for Hypothesis 1. 
Symbol Description 
CD In-degree centrality of user (i.e. number of followers) 
CP Pagerank centrality 
Y 1-year returns 
H 1-year Sharpe ratio 
S1 Dummy for one star rating (positive 1-year returns) 
S2 Dummy for two stars rating (positive 1-year returns with higher Sharpe ratio than 50% 
of users with positive returns) 
S3 Dummy for three stars rating (positive 1-year returns with higher Sharpe ratio than 90% 
of users with positive returns) 
AG Number of comments made in Shareville discussion groups 
AT Number of comments made on individual trades 
AI Number of comments made on individual instruments 
AU Number of comments posted on other users’ walls 
M1 Number of (non-follower) users contacted via private message 
M2 Number of (non-follower) users who have contacted the user via private message 
 
  
  18  
 
A similar regression is formed for the natural logarithm of 𝐶𝑃 using otherwise same regressors as in 
Equation 1, but adding also the logarithm of the in-degree centrality, ln 𝐶𝐷,𝑗, as a regressor: 
ln 𝐶𝑃,𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ⋅ ln 𝐶𝐷,𝑗 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝐻𝑗 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑆1,𝑗 + 𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑆2,𝑗 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑆3,𝑗 
            + 𝛽7 ⋅  ln(𝐴𝐺,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛽8 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝑇,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛽9 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝐼,𝑗 + 1)   
            + 𝛽10 ⋅ ln(𝐴𝑈,𝑗 + 1) +  𝛽11 ⋅ ln(𝑀1,𝑗 + 1) + 𝛽12 ⋅ ln(𝑀2,𝑗 + 1) (2) 
The purpose of the second regression is to identify factors that contribute to Pagerank centrality in 
the network beyond the number of followers the user has, i.e. factors that are relevant to influential 
users in the network when they decide whom to follow. 
The linear regression is calculated separately for both centrality measures using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method:  
?̂? = (𝑋′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑐 (3) 
where ?̂? are the coefficient estimates, 𝑋 the design matrix, and 𝑐 the vector of in-degree or Pagerank 
centralities. Student’s t-test is used to determine whether individual regression coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. The variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients is 
𝐶 = ?̂?2(𝑋′𝑋)−1 (4) 
where ?̂?2 is the mean square error (MSE) of the regression fit. Then, the test statistic for regression 
coefficient k is  
(𝑡0)?̂?𝑘  =
?̂?𝑘
√𝐶𝑘𝑘 
 (5) 
where 𝐶𝑘𝑘 is the k’th diagonal element of 𝐶. The linear regression and test statistic calculation are 
performed by standard R functions such as lm.  
After performing the regression for each full model, the non-significant regressor with the test statistic 
value closest to zero is removed from the model and the OLS regression is repeated. Goodness of the 
regression fit is measured by the adjusted coefficient of determination, which takes into account the 
degrees of freedom in the model (p. 799 in De Veaux et al., 2008): 
  19  
 
?̅?2 =
𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 (6) 
where 𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the mean squared error explained by the regression and 𝑀𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the total 
mean squared error of the data. If ?̅?2 of the model does not decrease, this process is iterated until the 
model contains only statistically significant regressors to identify a minimally complex regression 
model explaining the centrality with accuracy similar to the full model. The proportion of variance 
explained by the remaining regressors (relative to unadjusted 𝑅2) is then examined using analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) as implemented by function anova in R.  
4.3 Results 
Table 2 provides selected statistics on all Shareville users, top 50 users based on number of followers 
as of 31 March 2015, and top 50 users based on 1-year Sharpe ratio as of 31 March 2015. For 1-year 
returns and Sharpe ratio, the 1st and 100th percentiles of the whole dataset are excluded to remove 
outliers before calculating the statistics. The two top 50 groups have no common members, suggesting 
that Shareville users as a group are not following the most skilled investors in the community (insofar 
as the 1-year Sharpe ratio at a particular point in time actually reflects investor skill). 
Table 2: Selected statistics on Shareville users. For 1-year returns and Sharpe ratio, the 1st and 100th 
percentiles of the whole dataset are excluded to remove outliers. 
 Mean Median Min Max 
All users (N = 39,920)     
  Followers (CD) 2.0 0 0 2466 
  1-year returns 19% 21% -73% 130% 
  1-year Sharpe ratio 1.13 1.15 -2.06 4.28 
Top 50 by followers     
  Followers (CD) 532.8 385.5 214 2466 
  1-year returns 67% 64% -8% 126% 
  1-year Sharpe ratio 2.57 2.82 -0.08 4.06 
Top 50 by Sharpe ratio     
  Followers (CD) 14.1 2 0 154 
  1-year returns 60% 57% 27% 117% 
  1-year Sharpe ratio 4.24 4.24 4.22 4.28 
  
  20  
 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression specified in Equation 1 for the full model and the final 
model, as well as the variance in the data explained by the regressors in the final model (ANOVA). 
The variables explaining most variance are commenting on trades ( ln(𝐴𝑇 + 1)) and the Sharpe 
ratings (𝑆𝑖), so that higher risk-adjusted returns compared to other Shareville users indicate higher 
number of followers. There is no remaining component in the variance that would be explained by 
non-risk-adjusted 1-year returns (𝑌), 1-year Sharpe ratio (𝐻), or comments in discussion groups 
(ln(𝐴𝐺 + 1)). The residual (unexplained) variance is moderately high, 75% of total variance. 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression specified in Equation 2 for the full model and the final 
model, as well as the variance in the data explained by the regressors in the final model (ANOVA). 
The predicted number of followers is, as can be expected, a statistically significant predictor of a 
user’s Pagerank centrality, explaining 55.1% of variance in the data. Most of the other regressors are 
eliminated from the model or have only a marginal role in explaining variance in the data. Of the 
Sharpe ratio based variables, 𝑆3 is the only statistically significant one and has a negative coefficient. 
Residual (unexplained) variance is 41.8%. 
The evidence presented in Tables 3 and 4 is sufficient to confirm Hypothesis 1. Further implications 
of the results are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Table 3: Regression results for 𝐶𝐷. The total number of users included in the regression is 8,412. 
 Full model Final model 
Regressor 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Significance 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Significance 
Variance 
explained 
(intercept) 
0.9318 
(0.0177) 
+++ 
0.9317    
(0.0177) 
+++  
Y 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
    
H 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
    
S1 
0.1259 
(0.0237) 
+++ 
0.1261    
(0.0237) 
+++ 
6.2%  
(S1, S2 and S3 
combined) 
S2 
0.2774 
(0.0241) 
+++ 
0.2778    
(0.0241) 
+++ 
S3 
0.7169 
(0.0306) 
+++ 
0.7180    
(0.0306) 
+++ 
ln (AG + 1) 
0.0041 
(0.0201) 
    
ln (AT + 1) 
0.1758 
(0.0154) 
+++ 
0.1763    
(0.0153) 
+++ 12.4% 
ln (AI + 1) 
0.0278 
(0.0146) 
 
0.0283    
(0.0144) 
+ 0.7% 
ln (AU + 1) 
0.2458 
(0.0189) 
+++ 
0.2473    
(0.0176) 
+++ 2.8% 
ln (M1 + 1) 
0.6594 
(0.0367) 
+++ 
0.6595    
(0.0367) 
+++ 2.8% 
ln (M2 + 1) 
-0.0857 
(0.0361) 
+ 
-0.0854    
(0.0360) 
+ 0.1% 
   Residual variance: 75.0% 
+  p < 0.05     ++  p < 0.01     +++  p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Regression results for 𝐶𝑃. The total number of users included in the regression is 8,412. 
 Full model Final model 
Regressor 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Significance 
Coefficient 
(Std. error) 
Significance 
Variance 
explained 
(intercept) -11.06 
(0.01) 
+++ 
-11.07 
(0.01) 
+++  
ln CD 0.5830 
(0.0066) 
+++ 
0.5816 
(0.006) 
+++ 55.1% 
Y -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
    
H 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
    
S1 0.0046 
(0.0177) 
 
0.0046 
(0.0177) 
 
1.8%  
(S1, S2 and S3 
combined) 
S2 -0.0175 
(0.0181) 
 
-0.0124 
(0.0181) 
 
S3 -0.176 
(0.0235) 
+++ 
-0.1676 
(0.0235) 
+++ 
ln (AG + 1) 0.0107 
(0.0150) 
    
ln (AT + 1) 0.0347 
(0.0116) 
++    
ln (AI + 1) -0.0864 
(0.0109) 
+++    
ln (AU + 1) 0.104 
(0.0142) 
+++ 
0.0716 
(0.0105) 
+++ 0.4% 
ln (M1 + 1) 0.2610 
(0.0277) 
+++ 
0.2622 
(0.0277) 
+++ 0.4% 
ln (M2 + 1) 0.1202 
(0.0268) 
+++ 
0.1120 
(0.0267) 
+++ 0.4% 
   Residual variance: 41.8% 
+  p < 0.05     ++  p < 0.01     +++  p < 0.001 
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5 Study 2: Copy trading in Shareville 
Hypothesis 2: If an influential user trades on a particular stock, their followers will trade that stock 
more actively than other Shareville users. 
5.1 Motivation 
Propagation of information, ideas, and behavior from one individual to another is an inseparable 
element of social networking. In the context of investor networking, this includes not only investment 
analyses and strategies, but also individual investment (and divestment) decisions. While many forex 
trading and networking platforms have gone so far as to allow users to automatically copy other users’ 
trades, such copy trading makes sense only in the case of high-frequency, time-consuming day trading. 
It also requires a high level of trust in the other user’s trading skills, at least compared to the copying 
user’s own skills.  
In contrast to forex traders, most retail stock market investors are not high-frequency traders, and 
their investment decision are, at least in theory, based on an evaluation of listed companies along 
multiple dimensions of ambiguous information. The propagation of investment strategies and 
individual investment decisions within online investor networks can therefore be expected to be a 
relatively complex phenomenon, and apart from Heimer and Simon (2014), who demonstrate the 
influence of increased communication on the propagation of active trading strategies within a 
currency trading network, there is very little research on the subject. On the other hand, online 
platforms offer an excellent opportunity to investigate trading propagation, since the connections 
between investors are made explicit, and trades can be monitored on the intraday level. Recognizing 
the gap in the existing literature, this study comprises the first effort to quantify trading propagation 
in an online investor network focused on the stock market. 
5.2 Methods 
While Study 1 examines what factors contribute to the decision to follow another user, this study 
examines the degree of influence a user has on their followers. Arguably, since most Shareville users 
have no followers, any user with at least one follower can be considered to be influential to at least 
some degree. Thus, for each Shareville user with at least one follower, all buy-side trades executed 
between 26 Sep 2014 and 31 March 2015 (141,248 trades) are analyzed to see how many followers 
copy them. Sell-side trades are omitted since copying them would require the follower to hold the 
instrument in the first place, limiting the sample size and incurring a greater risk of sampling bias due 
to e.g. preferences related to investing style.  
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Figure 5: Accumulation of buy-side trades included in the analysis over the study period (from 26 Sep 
2014 to 31 Mar 2015). 
 
Figure 5 shows how the buy-side trades included in the analysis are accumulated over the study period. 
Although the Shareville user base more than quadruples over the study period, the trades are collected 
relatively evenly over the period (cf. Figure 3). This is because the share of users with followers is 
necessarily lowest among new users, so that the accumulation of trades by users with followers lags 
behind user base growth. 
For each buy-side trade, Figure 6 shows the number of followers the user making the trade has at the 
time of the trade. To further examine the role of influence in the network on copy trading, the trades 
are divided into two groups based on the number of followers the user making the trade has at the 
time of the trade. Group 1 contains trades by users with less than 50 followers and Group 2 trades by 
users with at least 50 followers. The limit of 50 followers is chosen arbitrarily to some degree, but as 
shown in Figure 6, it divides the trades so that the two groups span roughly similar intervals on a 
logarithmic scale with regard to the number of followers at time of trade. Group 1 contains 97% of 
buy-side trades analyzed. 
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Figure 6: For each buy-side trade, the number of followers the user making the trade has at the time 
of the trade. Trades are arranged by number of followers of the user making the trade, so that all 
trades in Group 2 are to the right of the vertical line. Only trades by users with at least one follower 
are included. 
 
Let now 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐾𝑗} denote the buy-side trades made by user 𝑗, 𝑛𝑗,𝑘 the number of followers of 
user 𝑗 who replicate trade 𝑘, and 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 the total number of followers user 𝑗 has at time of trade 𝑘. In 
this context, replication is defined as buying the same instrument later on the same date or during the 
next day (for Fridays, by end of next Monday). The copy trade rate per trade is then defined as  
            𝑟𝑗,𝑘 =
𝑛𝑗,𝑘
𝑁𝑗,𝑘
 (7) 
Since most users have just one or two followers, for most trades 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 is equal to zero or a simple 
fraction of small integers such as 
1
1
 or 
1
2
 (if 𝑛𝑗,𝑘 > 0 and 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 is small). Also, let 𝑆𝑗,𝑘 denote the total 
number of Shareville users who are from the same country as user 𝑗 at the end of the day when user 
𝑗 makes trade 𝑘, and 𝑠𝑗,𝑘 the total number of Shareville users who replicate trade 𝑘. A reference copy 
trade rate for 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 is then defined as 
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            𝑅𝑗,𝑘 =
𝑠𝑗,𝑘−𝑛𝑗,𝑘
𝑆𝑗,𝑘− 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
 (8) 
The reference rate provides an empirical estimate for the expected rate of replication arising from 
users coincidentally carrying out the same trade. There are several possible ways of defining the 
reference group, but here the use of 𝑆𝑗,𝑘 reflects the intuitive assumption that Shareville users from 
the same country trade more homogeneously than users from different countries, and thus provide 
the most natural reference group. For example, Finnish users prefer to trade in companies listed in 
the Helsinki stock exchange. Equation 8 thus provides a relatively simple means for estimating 𝑅𝑗,𝑘, 
and not restricting 𝑠𝑗,𝑘 and 𝑁𝑗,𝑘 to the user’s own country in practice further inflates the reference rate 
slightly to avoid underestimation. A more sophisticated estimate of the reference rate would require 
matching users based on behavioral characteristics, e.g. trading activity, and would add considerable 
complexity. 
Adjusting 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 for coincidental trade replication by subtracting 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 and averaging the adjusted rate 
over all users and trades yields an estimate for the copy trade rate arising from followers intentionally 
copying a trade by the followed user: 
            ?̅? =  𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =  
∑ (𝑟𝑗,𝑘−𝑅𝑗,𝑘)𝑗,𝑘
∑ 𝐾𝑗𝑗
 (9) 
To confirm or reject Hypothesis 2, Student’s one-tailed t-test3 is used to examine the null hypothesis 
that followers of a user are just as likely to replicate the user’s trades as other Shareville users, i.e. 
that the mean 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 0. Hypothesis 2 can be confirmed if this null hypothesis is rejected at the 
p < 0.05 level so that 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ > 0. The R function t.test is used for the statistical test. 
The values 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 for Group 1 and Group 2 (less than and at least 50 followers at time of trade) 
are compared using Welch’s two-tailed t-test for unequal variances (p < 0.05) to see whether the 
number of followers influences the copy trade rate. The R function t.test is used for the statistical 
test. Also, the cumulative number of copy trades is calculated for both groups to evaluate the 
prevalence of copy trading in the Shareville network. It is expected that trades in Group 2 will result 
in considerably more copy trades per original trade, since the number of potential copiers (followers) 
is higher than in Group 1.  
                                                 
3 Although the distribution of 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 cannot be expected to be normally distributed, the number of samples is in the 
thousands, so Student’s t-test can be applied based on the central limit theorem. 
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Figure 7: Joint distribution of copy trade rate and reference rate for all buy-side trades (N=141,248) 
by users with at least one follower. Each point corresponds to one trade.  
 
5.3 Results 
Figure 7 shows the joint distribution of the unadjusted copy trade rate 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 and the corresponding 
reference rate 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 for all buy-side trades made by users with at least one follower (7,459 users and 
141,248 trades in total). The average value of 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 is 0.012, well above the corresponding average for 
the reference trade rate 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 which is 0.003. Student’s one-tailed t-test for 𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘 results in a value 
of t = 37.5 for the test statistic and a p-value below 2.2×10-16, indicating that the null hypothesis that 
𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 0 can be rejected. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. 
When partitioning trades into Group 1 (trader has less than 50 followers) and Group 2 (trader has at 
least 50 followers), the results show that ?̅? (average adjusted copy trade propensity per follower) is 
higher for Group 1 (?̅? = 0.009) than for Group 2 (?̅? = 0.002). The difference is statistically significant 
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(Welch’s two-tailed t-test, p < 2.2×10-16). Figure 8 gives a more detailed view of how the adjusted 
copy trade rate decreases with the number of followers at time of trade. The adjusted copy trade rate 
is in practice close to zero for all trades by users with more than 50 followers. However, as shown in 
Figure 9, trades in Group 2 produce approximately one third of all copy trade activity in Shareville, 
even though the number of trades in Group 2 is only 3% of all trades (cf. also Figure 6). This is 
because the large number of followers more than compensates the lower copy trade rate per follower 
in Group 2. Table 5 shows summary statistics of the data and Groups 1 and 2. 
 
 
Figure 8: Copy trade rate as a function of the number of followers at time of trade. Each point 
corresponds to one trade. Negative values correspond to trades where the subtracted reference rate is 
greater than the unadjusted copy trade rate. 
 
 
  29  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Cumulative shares of trades and copy trades for Group 1 and Group 2. Trades are arranged 
by number of followers of the user making the trade, so that all trades in Group 2 are to the right of 
the vertical line. Copy trades are adjusted for coincidental copying as described in the text. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics on Hypothesis 2 results. The total number of distinct users is greater than 
the total number of users with followers since the same individual’s trades may be included in both 
groups. The third column indicates whether the difference between Group 1 and Group 2 is 
statistically significant (Welch’s two-tailed t-test). 
 Total Group 1 Group 2 p < 0.05 
Buy-side trades 141,248 137,107 4,141 n/a 
Distinct users 7,459 7,392 195 n/a 
Followers at time of trade (mean) 10.9 4.8 213.6 Yes 
𝑟𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅  0.013 0.013 0.005 Yes 
𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.003 0.003 0.003 Yes 
?̅? =  𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  0.009 0.009 0.002 Yes 
Estimated number of copy trades 6,174 4,008 2,166 n/a 
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6 Study 3: Selective communication in the network 
Hypothesis 3: An individual user is more likely to comment on trades in which they realize gains than 
on trades in which they realize losses. 
6.1 Motivation 
As discussed by e.g. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) and Heimer (2014), returns influence investor 
communication behavior according to the selective communication hypothesis: investors are less 
likely to communicate after losses in the market. Krasny (2013) and Dijk et al. (2014) have also 
shown that the investor’s awareness of their social status in the investor network influences portfolio 
allocation. Understanding and quantifying the selective communication phenomenon is therefore an 
important step in aiding investors to debias themselves against a natural tendency to downplay or 
rationalize poor trading decisions. This study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the 
selective communication effect at the individual trade level and quantifying its magnitude. 
6.2 Methods 
When a user sells an instrument above (below) its acquisition price, they realize gains (losses). 
Hypothesis 3 postulates that winners are more likely to brag about their success than losers are to 
lament their losses in front of the community. The first step towards analyzing this matter is 
establishing the correct approach to calculate the effective acquisition price and thus the returns. For 
example, when determining capital gains tax on sale of shares, Swedish tax authorities use the 
volume-weighted average acquisition cost (AAC) of all shares of the same type, even if only a portion 
of the shares is sold. Finnish tax authorities use the first-in-first-out (FIFO) method, where the 
acquisition price is based on chronological order, so that the oldest shares of the same type are sold 
first. Consequently, a Swedish investor buying shares in two or more transactions at different prices 
and selling some (but not all) of them later could end up making a profit, while a Finnish investor 
executing the same transactions at the same prices might make a loss, at least as far as taxation is 
concerned. 
The sell-side trade data available in this study does not carry acquisition price information, and 
portfolio data is available only on monthly level, so returns for sell-side trades are reconstructed from 
the available data for Nordnet accounts linked to a Shareville profile as follows. For each Swedish 
and Finnish Shareville user, trades in shares they did not hold on their Nordnet account at the end of 
31 Dec 2012 are tracked from 1 Jan 2013 onwards. Shares held at the end of 2012 are excluded to 
ensure that all acquisition prices are calculated similarly, and to focus on trades with a short-to-mid-
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term horizon (shares held for approximately two years or less). For investors who joined Nordnet 
after 2012, tracking starts on the calendar month after joining, and shares held at the end of the month 
of joining are excluded (these are often transferred from another service provider without acquisition 
price information). The remaining trade data then consists mostly4 of cases where the user buys shares 
of one type on one or more dates, and possibly sells them later on one or more dates. Then, for each 
sell-side trade, returns after trading costs are calculated using both the AAC and FIFO method. Trades 
with positive return are classified as gains and trades with zero or negative return are classified as 
losses. 
To examine Hypothesis 3, trades made after the user joins Shareville are linked with Shareville 
comment data by the user. The user can publish a comment on a specific trade they make, and they 
can in some cases also choose a description for the trade from a small set of predefined descriptions, 
such as “short-term trade”, “long-term trade”, etc. In the present analysis, such descriptions are also 
counted as comments. The dataset does not provide a direct connection between Nordnet trade data 
and Shareville comments, so the trades and comments are linked based on traded instrument and trade 
date. Any comments made on trades by other users are ignored, as are comments on the user’s own 
trades that are made only after another user has commented on the trade. 
If a user makes several trades on the same share and same side (buy or sell) during one day, these 
trades are excluded at this stage of the data processing. This ensures that each comment is linked to 
the right trade in the subsequent analysis of commenting behavior. Also, it may be expected that 
frequent (day) traders have a decreased propensity to comment on each individual trade, so their 
commenting behavior should in any case be analyzed separately from other users. Trades are also 
excluded from the analysis if the total traded value is suspiciously low (trading costs are 5% or more 
of traded value), which typically results from selling a very small number of shares (often just one) 
for some reason, or the estimated returns appear to be artificially low or high (less than -100% or over 
1,000%).  
To analyze the impact of loss and gain on commenting behavior, sell-side trades are divided into two 
categories: those that the trader chooses to comment, and those that they choose not to comment. This 
information is contrasted with the reconstructed gain and loss information to form a 2×2 contingency 
table (gain and comment, loss and comment, gain and no comment, loss and no comment). Pearson’s 
                                                 
4 In a minority of cases the user may sell shares that were not acquired in the market (e.g. transfer from another account, 
gift, option, or short selling), resulting in a negative balance on that share in the reconstructed portfolio. Since 
acquisition prices are not available for these sales, only returns from shares acquired in the market are considered in the 
analysis. 
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chi-squared test is then used to determine whether the observed commenting frequencies are higher 
for trades resulting in gains than for trades resulting in losses. The test is performed separately for 
Finnish and Swedish users, and for the AAC and FIFO methods of calculating the returns. Hypothesis 
3 is rejected if no statistically significant (p < 0.05) difference is observed in the commenting 
frequencies. The R function prop.test is used for the Pearson’s chi-squared test. 
To further analyze the relationship between returns and commenting behavior, the observed 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of non-commented and commented sells are formed as a 
function of the AAC return percentage of the sell. Hypothesis 3 can then be interpreted as the 
statement that the difference 
            CDFdiff (AAC return %) = CDFnot.commented − CDFcommented (10) 
should be greater than zero and increasing for negative values of AAC return. Furthermore, the 
difference should decrease for positive values of AAC return. 
In addition to analyzing commenting on sell-side trades of all users, a separate analysis is carried out 
for the subset of users who have realized both gains and losses as determined by AAC return. For 
user 𝑖, the commenting rates for gains and losses are determined: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 =  
Number of commented gains (AAC) by user 𝑖 
Number of gains (AAC) by user 𝑖
 (11) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  
Number of commented losses (AAC) by user 𝑖 
Number of losses (AAC) by user 𝑖
 (12) 
Hypothesis 3 can then be expressed as 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 < 0, while the corresponding null hypothesis 
is that the difference is zero or positive. Student’s paired one-tailed t-test is used to determine whether 
the null hypothesis may be rejected at the p < 0.05 level, and the analysis is carried out separately for 
Finnish and Swedish users. If the null hypothesis can be rejected, this provides further support for the 
selective communication hypothesis. 
The dataset in this study does not contain dividend information, so shareholder returns are slightly 
underestimated for those positions that are held over the ex-dividend date and then sold, leading to a 
potential systematic bias against observing the hypothesized commenting behavior (in cases where 
the dividends turn the position from losing to profitable). The impact of this bias is mitigated by the 
facts that it applies only to those positions that are held over the ex-dividend date, and on average 
dividend returns from positions held over a period of several months and closed after Shareville was 
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launched can be expected to be small compared to share price growth (the period from Jan 2013 to 
March 2015 witnessed roughly 50% gains in the Helsinki and Stockholm general stock market 
indices). Also, a user closing a losing position might still behave as if the outcome was a loss even if 
their total return ends up being slightly positive due to dividend returns. 
6.3 Results 
Table 6 shows a summary of the sell-side trades by Finnish and Swedish Shareville users between 26 
September 2014 and 31 March 2015. From a total of 111,781 sell-side trades, 86,927 were included 
in the analysis and 24,854 were excluded based on the criteria specified earlier (e.g. selling the same 
instrument multiple times during the same day). Compared to Finnish users, Swedish users have mean 
and median returns slightly closer to zero for both winning and losing trades, but higher standard 
deviation for returns from losing trades and smaller standard deviation for returns from winning trades. 
This indicates that especially the return distribution for winning trades is more heavy-tailed for the 
Finnish than Swedish trades. The differences in means between the Finnish and Swedish groups are 
statistically significant (Welch’s t-test for unequal variances, p < 0.05). 
Table 7 shows the contingency table of comment and sales data and the outcome of Pearson’s chi-
squared test. Overall, the propensity to comment trades is relatively low, so that only 2% of sells are 
commented by the trader. The commenting rate is similar for Finnish and Swedish trades. Pearson’s 
chi-squared test indicates that losing trades by Swedish Shareville users are less likely to receive 
comments than winning trades, with an effect magnitude of approximately 10% (1.9% vs. 2.1%). No 
difference is observed for the Finnish users. The method used for calculating trade returns (AAC or 
FIFO) does not have any substantial impact on the results.  
As further evidence to support the selective communication hypothesis, Figure 10 displays the 
difference in the observed cumulative distributions of non-commented trades and commented trades 
for the Finnish and Swedish data. The Swedish data in Figure 10, with the peak at almost exactly 0% 
AAC returns, provides strong support for the selective communication hypothesis. The narrow trough 
just left of the peak most likely represents noise in the data. The same behavior is not observed for 
the Finnish data, although the difference moves from zero to negative at approximately 0%, which 
indicates an increase in the propensity to comment trades when returns turn from negative to positive.  
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Table 6: Summary statistics of Study 3 data. 
  Finnish   Swedish  
Number of sell-side trades  29,652   57,275  
Losing trades (AAC/FIFO) 11,489 / 11,403 23,757 / 23,578 
Users in total  4,150   4,915  
Users commenting own trades  434   602  
 Median Mean Std. dev. Median Mean Std. dev. 
AAC returns       
  Losing trades -6.0% -12.0% ± 15.9% -4.6% -11.2% ± 17.1% 
  Winning trades 6.4% 16.3% ± 54.1% 5.4% 12.5% ± 24.6% 
FIFO returns       
  Losing trades -5.6% -10.9% ± 17.7% -4.3% -9.8% ± 20.4% 
  Winning trades 6.3% 15.4% ± 54.0% 5.2% 11.4% ± 23.7% 
 
 
Table 7: Contingency table for Hypothesis 3. The p-value is for the null hypothesis that the ratio of 
commenting is same for losing and winning trades (Pearson’s one-sided chi-squared test). 
  Finnish   Swedish  
 Comment No comment Ratio Comment No comment Ratio 
AAC returns       
  Losing trades 238 11,251 2.1% 439 23,318 1.9% 
  Winning trades 366 17,728 2.1% 690 32,626 2.1% 
  p-value 0.5975  p-value 0.0317 
FIFO returns        
  Losing trades 238 11,165 2.1% 430 23,148 1.9% 
  Winning trades 366 17,809 2.1% 699 32,791 2.1% 
  p-value 0.6526  p-value 0.0141 
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Figure 10: Difference between CDFs of non-commented and commented trades as a function of AAC 
returns. For example, based on data in Table 7, the value of the CDF for non-commented Swedish 
trades at zero returns is 41.7% and for commented trades 38.9%. The difference, 2.8%, can be read 
from the graph at the point where AAC returns = 0%. 86% of Finnish and 88% of Swedish trades are 
contained within the [-25%, 25%] return interval. 
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Table 8 summarizes the results from the paired t-test on 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 among Finnish and Swedish 
Shareville users with both losses and gains, and Figures 11 and 12 show the distribution of 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 −
𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 for the Finnish and Swedish users, respectively. Also here the results for the Swedish users are 
statistically significant (p-value 0.015) and in line with the selective communication hypothesis with 
an effect magnitude of approximately 20% (1.7% vs. 2.1%), while no statistically significant results 
are obtained for the Finnish users (p-value 0.16). However, the data in both Table 8 and Figure 11 
suggest that the Finnish users also exhibit selective communication, and the lack of statistical 
significance may be merely a question of insufficient sample size in relation to the effect magnitude. 
In both Finnish and Swedish users the observed effect magnitude is greater than in the previous 
analysis, where the commenting rates were calculated over winning and losing trades as opposed to 
individual investors. Repeating the analysis with FIFO returns did not affect the results appreciably. 
Based on these results, Hypothesis 3 is confirmed for Swedish but not for Finnish Shareville users.  
 
Table 8: Results from paired t-test on loss and gain commenting rates of Finnish and Swedish users. 
Data are given as mean (standard deviation) calculated over the users. The p-value is for the null 
hypothesis that 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛  ≥ 0. 
 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 p-value 
     
Finnish (N = 2046) 1.9% (9.8) 2.2% (9.3) −0.3% (13.1) 0.16 
Swedish (N = 2702) 1.7% (8.1) 2.1% (9.2) −0.5% (11.4) 0.015 
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Figure 11: Distribution of the difference in commenting rates 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 for Finnish users with 
both gains and losses. Bin width in the figure is 0.05. The bin at 0.0 corresponds to 84% of the users 
and has been removed to better show the distribution in other bins.
 
Figure 12: Distribution of the difference in commenting rates 𝑟𝑖,𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 for Swedish users with 
both gains and losses. Bin width in the figure is 0.05. The bin at 0.0 corresponds to 83% of the users 
and has been removed to better show the distribution in other bins.  
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7 Discussion 
This thesis presents three novel studies on the behavior of investors in an online investor network 
primarily focused on the stock market. The studies provide answers to three key research questions, 
namely What attributes and behavior determine an investor’s centrality in the network?, To what 
extent do central users influence trades by their followers?, and Are investors more inclined to discuss 
profitable trades than losses? The results also provide a general characterization of the online investor 
network, e.g. what can be considered typical attributes and behavior of an investor in such a network. 
Results from each study are discussed below, including their implications and relationship to previous 
research. 
7.1 Study 1: Attributes valued by Shareville users 
Investors in the Shareville network are able to comment on trades, individual instruments, and engage 
in public and private conversations with other investors. They are also able to view the trades and 
portfolio contents and past performance of other investors. The results obtained for Hypothesis 1 
indicate that when selecting which users to follow, users value particularly other users’ past 
performance (as reflected by the Sharpe ratio based ranking of the user within the network) and active 
commenting of trades. Both are intuitively plausible findings, since users can be expected to seek to 
learn from those users who have superior past performance and who are willing to communicate with 
others. Also, the Shareville user interface readily displays user rankings and recent commenting 
activity, so high-performing active users are the easiest to find.  
There is also a sizable unexplained component to the number of followers a user has. This may result 
from factors such as the portfolio composition of the user, the content of their communication with 
others, and especially the number of followers itself, so that users who already have many followers 
may attract more followers than other users with similar historical returns and other attributes. The 
latter effect could in principle be quantified by a longitudinal study, but some of the relevant data was 
only available in cross-sectional format at the end of the study period. In addition to these Shareville-
related confounding variables, factors external to Shareville may influence the networking. For 
example, some popular Shareville users maintain investing related blogs and cross-link the blog with 
their Shareville profile. Such extra visibility will certainly add to the number of followers these users 
have. 
Although past performance as reflected by the star rating appears to be a key factor in choosing which 
users to follow, none of the top 50 users by Sharpe ratio belong to the top 50 users by number of 
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followers as indicated by Table 2. The Sharpe ratio is calculated over a 1-year period that overlaps 
by up to six months with the user’s Shareville membership tenure, which is also the time period 
during which followers are attracted. To the extent that the Sharpe ratio can be used as a proxy for 
investor skill, this suggests that Shareville users as a group are not recognizing the most skilled 
investors for either past or future performance. This finding is reminiscent of the observation by Pan 
et al. (2012) that for most users, the number of followers is a poor predictor of future performance. 
On the other hand, when the simple Sharpe ratio-based star ranking is used as a regressor of the 
number of followers a user has, 1-year return and Sharpe ratio do not provide any additional 
explanatory power. This is analogous to research on Morningstar fund ratings and investment flows 
by Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), who observe that retail investors prefer simple summarizing 
information, such as star ratings, over more specific quantitative performance measures when 
allocating investments into mutual funds.  
It is also possible that high Sharpe ratios are symptomatic of a high-volatility investment style relying 
on active trading in a small number of instruments and use of leverage, and the top 50 users by Sharpe 
ratio simply represent the “lucky few” who have recently obtained large gains with the method. In 
this case, a high Sharpe ratio alone might not be a very good proxy for investor skill, and should be 
combined with some performance measure that emphasizes consistently outperforming the relevant 
market index or average peer returns. However, due to the relatively short data period of this study 
compared to the typical stock market investment horizon, no proper analysis of factors linked to 
historical and future performance could be carried out. 
Results from the Pagerank centrality analysis provide a view into the preferences of well-connected 
users, i.e. those whose followers themselves have many followers. While Pagerank centrality is 
naturally strongly correlated with the number of followers a user has, it is less tightly linked to 
belonging to the highest performing three-star category of users. The magnitude of the effect is not 
very large, but it is statistically significant and may reflect behavior where users with many followers 
put more weight on non-performance related criteria, such as investment style or portfolio 
composition, when choosing which users to follow. For example, it might be expected that the three-
star category of users contains a disproportionate share of users trading actively in only one or two 
instruments, since well-balanced portfolios are less likely to produce extreme negative or positive 
returns. The users with most followers could be more cautious investors who are not interested in 
following portfolios with a small number of instruments or generating returns based on high turnover 
and use of leverage.  
  41  
 
As with the number of followers, a large share of the variance in Pagerank centrality is not explained 
by the regression variables used. This, too, is a natural consequence of the lack of suitable variables 
for e.g. quantifying the quality of interactions within the Shareville network, and omitting any positive 
feedback effects in the level of connectedness of the user. 
Previous studies on online investing networks have not examined in detail what factors influence 
connection formation within the network. Pan et al. (2012) find a weak relationship between the 
historical returns of a user and their rank by number of followers, mainly visible for the top 50 or top 
100 users by number of followers (total size of user base not reported). They suggest that users tend 
to erroneously interpret the number of existing followers as a proxy for trading skill, even though 
historical returns are visible to all. Their observations are to some extent in line with the findings of 
this study: although the number of followers in Shareville is correlated with the 1-year Sharpe ranking, 
this correlation explains only a small portion of total variance in the number of followers, and e.g. 
active communication within the network, especially commenting on trades, appears to have a greater 
role. However, direct comparison of these results with Pan et al. (2012) is not possible due to differing 
data and methods. 
Since Shareville content is primarily generated by the users within the constraints set by Shareville 
features, the observation that some user-generated content is poorly correlated with centrality in the 
network may signal that the corresponding features are underutilized, or are not perceived to add 
value. For example, it might be expected that sharing information such as valuation analyses on 
individual instruments would add to an individual’s influence and centrality in the network by 
attracting new followers. However, the fact that commenting on instruments has only very minor 
explanatory power towards the user’s centrality suggests that this feature is not very important for 
Shareville users. This interpretation is supported by Shareville user feedback (not published here) 
criticizing the low information content of many comments and lack of quality share analyses 
compared to other investing communities such as Seeking Alpha.  
Since each additional feature tends to clutter the user interface and increases complexity of the service, 
the Shareville service must be continuously developed in order to either replace low value-add 
features with more useful ones, or identify means for increasing the value of the existing features. A 
guiding philosophy in Shareville development has been an emphasis on in-service recognition to 
encourage certain behavior, such as automatically granting a special token for users who comment 
on their own trades, instead of external rewards such as discounts on Nordnet trading commissions. 
One such improvement could be further gamification of Shareville with the help of badges or points, 
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similar to those used in various crowdsourced online wiki projects, to recognize valuable individual 
contribution such as equity analysis. 
As indicated above, the chosen regression analysis approach to identifying attributes valued by 
Shareville users when they decide which users to follow ignores many qualitative variables and path 
dependencies that may influence user behavior. However, even though some of these might be 
quantified as continuous or dummy regression variables, the interpretation of the resulting regression 
results would be increasingly ambiguous and would require other methods to corroborate them. The 
user attributes used in the regression in this study are ones that are both easily quantifiable, such as 
the number of various types of messages published, and represent content that is immediately visible 
to other users in the Shareville user interface, such as the star rating, so they provide information 
about the relative importance of the various features to Shareville users. A more in-depth analysis is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and should include multiple methods for measuring service usage and 
user experience, including qualitative ones such as surveys. 
Shareville users form a directed network where each user decides which users to follow, and the 
followed user may or may not decide to reciprocate in kind. This study examines properties which 
attract followers in general, but it does not delve into the finer dynamics of the follower-followed 
relationship. In particular, potentially relevant areas for further investigation include the properties of 
the follower (i.e., what kind of users follow other users), the determinants of two-way connections 
(i.e., when is the followed user most likely to start following the follower), and predictors of 
connection formation between two specific users (i.e., why does a particular user choose to follow a 
particular user). Examining these questions would provide a richer picture of user behavior and 
network formation in Shareville, and would thus also aid Shareville development. 
7.2 Study 2: Copy trading in Shareville 
This is the first study to investigate the role of peer influence in an online investor network as a 
determinant of share trading behavior. The act of imitating another’s actions is a fundamental 
manifestation of peer influence, as witnessed by the popularity of copying other users’ trades in online 
currency trading networks. Although in the case of Shareville there is no way to conclusively 
determine which trades are made in imitation of a followed user, and individual users most likely 
base trading decisions on multiple sources of information, the results obtained for Hypothesis 2 
provide strong evidence of copy trading behavior in Shareville and a quantitative estimate of its rate 
of occurrence. Adjusting for potential coincidental copying further improves the reliability of the 
results. 
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A central finding of this study is that copy trading is at least thus far a relatively minor driver of 
trading activity in Shareville. For one hundred buy-side trades by users with followers, an average of 
six copy trades are estimated to be generated. For comparison, Liu et al. (2014) report that 
approximately 68% of the forex trades in their data are generated by automatically or manually 
copying a trade by another user. The difference most likely stems from the nature of forex trading as 
a high-frequency, high-turnover activity largely based on intraday timing of trades according to 
currency price fluctuations, whereas most stock investors make relatively few trades, the investment 
horizon is long enough to mitigate the effect of daily market fluctuations, and trading decisions are 
typically based on the investor’s personal opinion of the target company’s future prospects. Instead 
of Shareville users blindly copying trades by other users, it seems more plausible that trades by well-
connected users act as triggers or reminders for their followers to consider trading in the same 
instrument. 
The small total number of copy trades also highlights the problem with reconstructing the investor 
network from closely timed stock exchange trades as done by Ozsoylev et al. (2014). In the Shareville 
data, where the actual connections between users are observed, the average share of followers who 
replicate a given trade within a time window of over one day is just 1.3%, and even smaller when 
accounting for coincidental replication. This means that reconstructing the network based on the 
observed replications would miss most of the actual connections, and more importantly well over 90% 
of trades by Shareville users are made independently, i.e. without evidence of copying another user. 
The network reconstruction by Ozsoylev et al. (2014) may be effective in identifying which traders 
are well-connected and able to take advantage of early access to information affecting stock prices, 
but such a network should not be interpreted to represent actual connections between traders, 
especially retail investors who trade infrequently. 
As could be expected, a large share of the copy trades is generated by the followers of a few central 
users. Some investor networking platforms, such as eToro, provide monetary rewards to the most 
copied traders, since this encourages skilled traders to join and share their trades in the network. This 
makes the network more attractive to all users, and consequently boosts both the number of users and 
the average trading volume per user. However, monetary rewards also fundamentally alter the 
relationship between the user and service provider by blurring the line between spontaneously 
generated and sponsored content. This may result in other users questioning the motives behind 
individual comments and posts by central users, which in turn detracts from the value of the whole 
network as a platform for sharing and learning. 
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Users will return to Shareville only if they perceive they are getting value out of it, so any increase in 
an individual user’s trading activity should come from making “better” trades than before and 
learning from past experiences as well as the actions of others. This tenet applies to both central users 
and their followers, and provides a guideline for developing new use cases for Shareville around the 
existing networking, trading, commenting, and messaging features. For example, the platform could 
automatically identify when two connected users make similar trades within a given timespan and 
offer them a chance to briefly discuss the motivation for the particular trade. When a user sells a 
financial instrument, Shareville could notify their followers who hold the same instrument. Such 
features might require an opt-out functionality for users with hundreds of followers or active traders 
who don’t want to engage in discussions with others on a regular basis. On the other hand, most 
people seek confirmation of their beliefs from other like-minded individuals, so such features could 
at the same time be welcomed as valuable but lead to an echo chamber effect that hinders the actual 
learning process. 
An interesting issue related to copy trading is the potential for creating market disruptions at the level 
of individual instruments. In theory, a central user in the network might buy a low-liquidity instrument, 
triggering a series of copy trades that would increase demand for the particular instrument and push 
the price up, at which point the central user could sell their recently purchased shares with profit. For 
example, daily trading volumes of some of the smaller companies in the Helsinki stock exchange are 
of the order of 10,000 EUR, and the number of trades is in the single or low double digits. On the 
other hand, some Shareville users have up to 2,000 followers, so a single trade by such a user could 
generate two or three copy trades with a high probability, and have a measurable impact on the daily 
trading volume for an illiquid share. While it is not certain that the average copy trade rate applies in 
the extreme case of the most connected users trading in low-volume instruments, the possibility for 
deliberate or unintentional price manipulation cannot be ruled out based on this study, especially as 
the Shareville community is still constantly growing and new connections are constantly formed. 
Further research is therefore needed to address this topic. 
The approach taken in this study analyzes copy trading as the aggregate behavior of a user’s followers. 
The results allow estimating macroscopic properties of copy trading, such as the number of 
individuals participating and trading volumes generated. This study does not analyze the factors 
influencing an individual user’s decision to copy a particular trade, nor the probability that an 
individual follower will copy a particular trade. Also, since individuals are constrained in the amount 
of capital they can invest and by transaction costs from trading, copy trading volumes may to some 
extent cannibalize other trading activity, and the impact of this effect is not evaluated in this study.  
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From the point of view of the individual user, it would be useful to know whether copy trading 
generally leads to higher or lower returns than trades placed without direct influence from the network. 
The results from Pan et al. (2012) and Liu et al. (2014) would suggest that since individual users are 
generally not very good at identifying skill in others, and discretionary copy trades perform poorly 
compared to automatic mirroring of a successful trader’s actions, copying the trades of other 
Shareville users may not be the best way to improve portfolio returns. However, as noted earlier, copy 
trades in Shareville are unlikely to represent just blind copying of another user’s actions, and the user 
may close the position independently of the user whose actions were originally copied, so it could 
turn out that whether or not an individual trade is a copy trade has little discernible impact on the 
eventual outcome. 
As Shareville user base expands and new connections are formed in the network, also the volume of 
social and copy trading may be expected to increase. A logical continuation of the present study 
would therefore be to investigate the propagation of behavior, investing styles, and investing 
strategies from one user to others in the network. Behavioral patterns of interest and relevance include, 
among others, the propensity to communicate with other users in the network, a focus on large, mid, 
or small cap companies, a focus on growth or value stocks, active vs. passive trading, and trading in 
non-domestic stock exchanges. Future studies may delve more deeply into these areas. 
7.3 Study 3: Selective communication in Shareville 
The selective communication hypothesis describes a basic human tendency to emphasize information 
that portrays oneself in a positive light when communicating with others, while withholding evidence 
of the opposite. It may also reflect unconscious cognitive biases, such as the confirmation and 
attribution biases introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), so that the individual inadvertently 
focuses on those facts and events that support their self-image as a skilled investor, and furthermore 
attributes successful investment decisions to their own judgment instead of broader market 
movements or random chance.  
Previous evidence for the selective communication hypothesis has been indirect, relying on e.g. 
geographical proximity and population aggregates of stock traders as presented by Kaustia and 
Knüpfer (2012), or on the individual trader level based on aggregate returns of forex traders, as 
presented by Heimer and Simon (2014). The latter study also gives a rough estimate of the event 
magnitude, reporting that moving from the 10th to the 90th return percentile increases a trader’s 
communication propensity by approximately 25% of the average communication propensity. 
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This thesis presents the first effort to investigate selective communication in the stock market at the 
individual trade level. Statistically significant evidence of selective communication is found for 
Swedish but not for Finnish investors. The share of users commenting their own sales is 10-12% in 
the sample analyzed, depending on the country, and the magnitude of the selective communication 
effect in the Swedish investor population corresponds to an approximately 10-20% lower propensity 
for an investor to comment on their losing trades compared to winning trades. The observed 
magnitude of the selective communication effect is broadly comparable to that reported by Heimer 
and Simon (2014), especially considering the differences in study settings. Also, the effect is already 
seen clearly between slightly negative and slightly positive returns, as demonstrated in Figure 10. 
This is what would be expected if the relevant variable is the sign of the return, as suggested by the 
selective communication hypothesis, and not just the magnitude. 
In a separate unreported robustness check, the analyses were repeated only for trades with returns 
between -20% and +20% to prevent extreme gains or losses from distorting the results. The results 
from the robustness check were nearly identical to the analysis done with the full data. In another 
unreported test, a regression analysis was carried out to determine whether the level of returns is 
significant in determining the magnitude of the selective communication effect. In the end, no 
statistically significant connection was identified, possibly because commenting propensity is 
apparently diminished considerably already for small losses (cf. Figure 10). 
It is not clear why the Swedish trade data produces statistically significant results while the Finnish 
data does not. The returns were estimated using both Swedish and Finnish tax authority practices with 
virtually identical outcomes. However, there are approximately twice as many Swedish trades as there 
are Finnish trades in the data, and a selective communication effect of similar magnitude in the 
Finnish data as was seen in the Swedish data would correspond to a difference of just few tens of 
comments between losing and winning Finnish trades. Also, in the Finnish data of Figure 10 the 
observed distribution of commented and non-commented trades as a function of returns does bear 
some similarities to the expected distribution under the selective communication hypothesis, and 
when comparing loss and gain commenting propensities within the same individual, there is a non-
significant difference in the same direction as in the Swedish data but of smaller magnitude. Therefore, 
it is possible that the influence of the selective communication effect in the Finnish data is simply 
masked by noise due to the smaller sample size. 
Heimer and Simon (2014) suggest that selective communication propagates active trading strategies 
in online investor networks, since the extreme positive returns of some active traders increase 
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communication between users, which in turn stimulates trading, while negative returns don’t have a 
similar effect. This hypothesis was not tested with the Shareville data, and implementing a test with 
sufficient statistical power might prove challenging, considering the small total number of comments 
in the data. However, considering that only a small fraction of Shareville trades are commented by 
the trader in the first place, and the difference in commenting frequency between winning and losing 
trades amounts to an imbalance of some tens of comments over the 6-month study period, any impact 
of selective communication on active trading strategy propagation in Shareville can be expected to 
be relatively minor so far.  
It is plausible that individuals more prone to selective communication are also more susceptible to 
the disposition effect. Heimer (2014) presents evidence indicating that the magnitude of the 
disposition effect at the level of the individual user may be inversely correlated with the tendency of 
the user to communicate in an investor network. He explains this as a manifestation of social 
bargaining between investors of different experience levels, but future research could provide 
alternative explanations. For example, it should be investigated whether selective communication, 
which measures the investor’s readiness to admit their own mistakes to others, is correlated with the 
disposition effect, which relates to the investor’s readiness to consciously admit their own mistakes 
and treat gains and losses on equal terms.  
If a connection between the disposition effect and selective communication were observed, various 
user-specific metrics could be introduced to services like Shareville to aid users in debiasing 
themselves and learning from their own mistakes as well as from other users. For example, useful 
information might include the number of trades made, how many of these incurred profits or losses, 
summary statistics on comments made on winning and losing trades, how long they hold instruments 
on average, and how they compare in these measures to other Shareville users. From the Shareville 
users’ point of view, better awareness of the selective communication effect might help individual 
investors to monitor their own trading behavior more objectively. 
The methods used for investigating the selective communication hypothesis in this thesis are focused 
on individual trades and their comments. Further research would help in determining the wider 
implications of the observed results, such as the influence of the selective communication effect on 
copy trading and propagation of investment styles in Shareville. Also, it would be interesting to 
determine how the selective communication effect manifests itself on the individual user level: is the 
propensity to publish comments slightly smaller for losing trades for nearly all users, or is there a 
smaller subgroup of users who are very keen on commenting winning trades but never comment 
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losing trades? The analysis presented here could be extended by combining the trade and comment 
data with user background data to reveal differences between users in their tendency to practice 
selective communication. This could help in identifying risk factors that predispose investors to 
biased messaging, and in identifying the negative consequences of selective communication for both 
the recipient and originator of the communication.  
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8 Conclusions 
Online interactions form a growing share of information exchange between investors. Key features 
distinguishing online investor networks like Shareville from traditional interaction settings are user 
anonymity, extensive disclosure of portfolio contents, trades, and returns, and the possibility to 
contact, follow, and copy trades by any member of the community regardless of physical location or 
prior acquaintance. Providing access to an online investor network can allow an online brokerage to 
differentiate itself from competition, especially in regard to traditional banks. As the popularity of 
such services increases, there will undoubtedly be growing demand for features that can be shown to 
help users make better investment decisions. 
This is the first study to observe and analyze user behavior in an online investor network focused on 
the stock market. Previous results from currency trading network studies are not generalizable to 
stock investor networks, since trading strategies and investor value creation are based on different 
premises in these two markets. This thesis therefore establishes a quantitative baseline of how retail 
stock market investors may be expected to interact and influence each other in an online network. 
The results will also hopefully aid in further development of Nordnet’s Shareville platform, and 
provide retail investors a better understanding of their own behavior and that of others in the network. 
Among the key findings of this thesis is the observation that historical portfolio performance and 
activity in the network are relevant but inadequate variables in explaining the number of followers a 
user has, suggesting that the “wisdom of the crowd” is also guided by other, more qualitative factors 
as well as chance when identifying which users are worth following in the network. The results also 
indicate that when evaluating other investors, users emphasize simplified and salient information in 
the user interface, to the extent that variables such as historical portfolio performance and Sharpe 
ratio may be condensed to a single four-level indicator (the Shareville star rating). Additional 
indicators may be therefore developed to facilitate identifying and following users with other 
attractive qualities beyond portfolio performance. 
This thesis also provides evidence that Shareville users’ investment decisions are sometimes 
influenced by the users whom they are following. The practice of copy trading is, however, much 
rarer than in forex trading networks, most likely reflecting other considerable differences between 
stock investing and forex trading. Since the probability to copy a trade is low for an individual user, 
the aggregate influence of a single trade on the rest of the investor network via copy trading is 
typically negligible, except in the case of the small minority of users who have hundreds or even 
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thousands of followers. As the popularity of online investor networks grows, the influence of 
individual investors on the decisions of others can be expected to grow and provide opportunities to 
study also the propagation of stock market trading strategies. 
Finally, research presented in this thesis shows that Shareville users are more willing to comment on 
trades resulting in gains than those resulting in losses, indicating that the knowledge that portfolios 
and trades can be openly viewed by other users does not preclude selective communication. The 
magnitude of the selective communication effect is even greater when comparing gain and loss 
commenting by the same user, and may amount to up to a 20% decrease in communicating propensity 
for trades where investors realize losses.  
While statistically significant results on selective communication were obtained only for Swedish and 
not Finnish users, the evidence does not necessarily reflect cultural differences between the two 
nationalities, but rather the smaller size of the Finnish sample. Since the practice of commenting on 
one’s own trades is not yet very widespread in Shareville, the influence of selective communication 
on e.g. the propagation of trading strategies is expected to be minor, but knowledge of the 
phenomenon may help in developing meaningful tools for all Shareville users to analyze their past 
trades and own performance more objectively, and become better investors in the process. 
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